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THE LIMITATION OF LABOR PREEMPTION:
SURVIVABILITY OF CONTRACT RIGHTS
DURING EMPLOYER LOCKOUTS
ANDREW F. GANN, JR.*
“In life, as in chess, forethought wins.”
~Charles Buxton
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2011, the National Football League (NFL) and the National
Football League Players Association (NFLPA) entered into a situation where
each side had to choose a legal strategy that would create the best result for its
organization as the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired.1 This
single document, the CBA, concerned the entire relationship between the NFL
and the NFLPA. After the CBA expired, this single document no longer
governed the relationship between the employer and employees until the parties agreed upon a new CBA. Faced with this expiration and the goal of signing a more favorable CBA, the NFL decided to lockout its players, preventing
the players from receiving any paychecks until a new CBA was signed. In response, the NFLPA decided to no longer be the bargaining arm of the NFL
players by disclaiming its interest, allowing the players to bring an antitrust
violation against the NFL for its lockout strategy. While facially this strategy
seemed plausible, the NFL players ultimately lost their antitrust action and
were forced to sign an arguably less-than-ideal CBA agreement.2 With the
* 2016–2017 Law Clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Norman K. Moon of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. I earned my J.D. from the University of
Virginia School of Law and my B.A. from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. I
would like to thank my wife, Russie Gann, and my parents, Andy and Sherrie Gann, for their unwavering love and support. I would like to thank Professor J. Gordon Hylton for all of his help in allowing me to develop this article. I would also like to thank the staff of the Marquette Sports Law Review for their help in preparing this article for publication.
1. Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011). Throughout this paper, I will use the terms
“league” and “team” interchangeably. While this opening paragraph sets the stage and goal of the
paper, the following three paragraphs will return to Brady v. NFL and provide a concrete example
concerning this article’s proposed legal strategy to the 2011 labor dispute.
2. I must note that nothing in this article should be taken as suggesting any negativity towards the
NFLPA. As the recent developments in NFL player concussions has shown, the NFLPA is an integral part of a player’s life and safety. This article only produces a framework that could be utilized to
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history of the 2011 CBA negotiations as the backdrop, this article explores a
different legal strategy that contracted NFL players could use. This strategy,
explained more fully below, would involve the ability of any NFL player with
a valid contract to bring a state-law-breach-of-contract claim demanding to be
paid. This ability to bring state-law-contract claims during a lockout would be
a
complete
game-changer and allow the NFL players to regain some market control in
future CBA expirations, ensuring that a fair, market-controlled CBA is agreed
upon. Ultimately, this article provides the NFLPA with an alternative strategy
to fill the void left after the 2011 labor dispute.
To better understand the dynamic of bringing state-law claims, it is
important to fully examine the contours of the 2011 labor dispute and provide
an example of two players who could have utilized this state-law strategy to
obtain a successful result. As mentioned above, on March 11, 2011, the CBA
between the NFL and the NFLPA expired. On March 12, 2011, the teams
decided to lockout their players.3 By locking out the players, the teams
prevented the players from entering their facilities, practicing, or playing any
games. To combat this lockout, the players decertified the union4 and brought
antitrust actions against the teams seeking injunctive relief from the lockout.5
But, the players were unsuccessful in this action as the Eighth Circuit ultimately denied their injunction request.6
Without the ability to obtain an injunction against a lockout, many sports
analysts have argued that the players will never have a strong bargaining
position when negotiating a CBA in the future.7 For example, Brady v. NFL
forced players to accept an arguably unfavorable CBA.
However, what if this conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the players
had a chance to regain bargaining power through an alternative mechanism
that is the focus of many of their lives—player contracts? Let us imagine, for
example, that on March 12, 2011, two famous brothers, Eli and Peyton
produce a more favorable CBA in the future.
3. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663.
4. This action results in the Union no longer having the ability to bargain on behalf of the players.
5. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663.
6. Id.
7. See generally NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (2011), https://nflpaweb.blob.
core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf
[hereinafter CBA]. See Gregg Rosenthal, The CBA in a Nutshell, PROFOOTBALLTALK (July 25,
2011), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/the-cba-in-a-nutshell/. These articles could be
the
result of the media’s portrayal of the CBA negotiations, which failed to realize any positive clauses
the NFLPA gained. However, with that aside, this article strives to ensure that the players are capable
of signing a more favorable CBA in the future.

GANN 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/19/17 9:59 AM

2017]C O N T R A C T R IG H T S D U R I N G E M P L O Y E R L O C K O U T S 399
Manning, decided not to join the action seeking antitrust violations. Instead,
suppose the Manning brothers sought state-breach-of-contract claims on
grounds that their player contracts had been violated by the lockout.8 The
Manning brothers could have brought suit in the states where they are popular
public figures, New York and Indiana respectively. In addition, either judges,
many of whom are elected, or juries, who would likely be made up of local
team fans, would decide these cases.
With this hypothetical lawsuit in mind, this article argues that NFL
contracted players should consider a breach of contract lawsuit when the CBA
expires in the future. In order to elaborate on that argument, this article proceeds in four parts (with the Introduction being Part I). Part II of this article
begins by discussing past labor disputes in the NFL. This discussion will
show that the labor disputes in the past have resulted in a flip-flop of bargaining
power
between the teams and players. With Brady, the power remains in the hands
of the teams. Second, it discusses two critical cases: Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc.,9 and Brady v. NFL.10 Finally, this section analyzes the impact of section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.11
Part III examines the possible preemptive effect of section 301. It begins
with a broad discussion of the United States Supreme Court case law directly
involving section 301. This discussion will show that the Supreme Court
views section 301’s preemptive effect narrowly. Part III then turns to sportsspecific case law to demonstrate that player contracts remain valid through
possible
labor strife. One specific case, Williams v. NFL,12 provides strong arguments
that section 301 does not preempt state law in the sports context, and it provides a more generalized discussion of section 301 preemption as it specifically
relates to state-contract law.
Part IV explains why this state-contract law exemption should not frighten
labor law scholars since professional sports athletes are the only viable
plaintiffs. This is due to two unique labor situations. First, professional sports
8. Both of these players had valid contracts that extended into the 2011−2012 season. Ralph
Vacchiano, Manning, Giants Agree to Record Contract, NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2009),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/giants/giants-eli-manning-richest-qb-nfl-super-bowlmvp-agrees-6-year-97-5m-extension-article-1.394959; Albert Breer, Colts Put Franchise Tag on
Manning While Negotiating New Deal, NFL (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story
/09000d5d81e534e5/article/colts-put-franchise-tag-on-manning-while-negotiating-new-deal.
9. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
10. 644 F.3d 661.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2016).
12. 582 F.3d at 876−78.
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athletes are able to sign long-term contracts that extend past the CBA’s
expiration. These contracts are highly individualized with the exact term and
money negotiated for each athlete.13 Second, professional athletes, more
specifically NFL athletes, are not afforded comparable employment in the
North American market. Due to this limited scope, these potential actions
must be considered a “sporting exception” analog.
II.

THE GAME FIELD: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTOURS OF THE FIELD
A.

Brief History of NFL Labor Disputes

Before one can understand the importance of this article, the history of
NFL labor strife must be examined.14 This history begins in 1968, when the
NFLPA asserted itself as an independent union and the sole bargaining body
for NFL players.15 Six months after this designation, the players decided that
they were not receiving proper compensation and initiated a strike.16 Less
than two weeks later, the strike ended and a new CBA was finalized.17 Unfortunately, many players were still unsatisfied with the salary provisions of this
new CBA.18
Two years later, in 1970, the players went on strike again.19 This strike
was short-lived, however, because the owners threatened cancellation of the
season.20 With the new four-year CBA adopted that year, the players did not
have another opportunity to strike until July 1, 1974. The players demanded
the “[e]limination of the option clause and ‘Rozelle Rule,’”21 and called for
impartial arbitration disputes and individualized contracts.22 This time, the
13. As Part IV explains, these individualized contracts may only exist in one other setting: the
entertainment industry.
14. For a brief overview of the labor disputes, see Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes,
USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-03-03-nfllabor-disputes-timeline_N.htm.
15. See William N. Wallace, The Players Won, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1968.
16. See William N. Wallace, N.F.L. Players Reject Owner’s Offer: Strike Favored by a 377–17
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011.
17. See id.
18. Kevin Nogle, NFL and NFLPA Officially End Labor Negotiations and Sign 10-Year CBA,
PHINSIDER (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.thephinsider.com/2011/8/6/2347749/nfl-and-nflpa-officiallyend-labor-negotiations-and-sign-10-year-cba.
19. History, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.com/about/history (last visited May 15,
2017).
20. Id.
21. Id. The “Rozelle Rule” was also famously litigated in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976).
22. History, supra note 19.
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players returned to the field and played without a new CBA until March 1977.
This new CBA included some of the players’ requests, such as the impartial
arbitration, and was set to expire after the 1981 season.23 Two weeks into the
1982 football season, the players executed a strike, demanding a fixed 55% of
the league revenues.24
In November 1982, the parties reached a
tentative settlement, giving the players $1.28 billion over the next five seasons.25 On December 5, 1982, a new CBA was ratified.26
In 1987, with the 1982 CBA set to expire, the players decided to initiate a
strike.27 To combat this strike in a different way, the owners began the season
with replacement players.28 On October 15, 1987, after two weeks of
replacement player games, the contracted NFL players decided to return to the
field.29 In addition to ending the strike, the NFLPA filed an antitrust suit.30 In
Powell v. NFL, the players challenged the first refusal, compensation system,
and other restrictions that were at issue in prior labor negotiations dating back
to the early 1970s.31 The district court judge determined that the first refusal,
compensation system, and standard player contract were not protected labor
practices because of the expiration of the CBA.32 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed and held that the labor exemption applied because there was an
“ongoing” collective bargaining relationship.33 In order to combat this decision, the NFLPA voted to disclaim its interest.34 By disclaiming, the union
would renounce its representation of the players through the bargaining process, thus causing Powell to lose its legal force.35 Subsequently, the players,
without the NFLPA, filed another lawsuit.36 In McNeil v. NFL, players, whose
contracts were set to expire after the 1989 season, challenged the same modi-

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bell, supra note 14.
30. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D. Minn. 1988).
31. Id. at 779.
32. Id. at 788−89.
33. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989).
34. See Bell, supra note 14.
35. See id.
36. See generally McNeil v. NFL, No. 4-90-476, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21561, at *1 (D. Minn.
Sept. 10, 1992).
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fied free agency system as the Powell litigation.37 After two days of deliberating, the jury returned a favorable verdict for the players,38 awarding damages
of $543,000.39 In order to capitalize on this verdict, the players filed another
suit seeking an injunction against the newly modified free agency system.40
The district court judge granted the injunction, forcing both sides to negotiate
a new CBA in 1993 with the players gaining the upper hand.41
From 1993 to 2008, the labor negotiations continued peacefully with each
side agreeing to extend the previous CBA. However, in 2008, the owners
decided to halt these peaceful labor negotiations as they sought to regain control and opt out of the final two years of the CBA.42 As a result, the CBA was
set to expire on March 11, 2011.43 Leading up to this expiration, the league
owners and players negotiated to no avail.44 Understanding that the deadline
was going to arrive with no agreement, the owners decided that they would institute a “lockout” of the “bargaining unit” instead of allowing the players to
strike first.45 This lockout procedure prevented players from “entering League
facilities, from receiving any compensation or benefits, and from performing
any employment duties including playing, practicing, working out, attending
meetings, making promotional appearances, and consulting medical and
training personnel.”46 To combat this lockout, the NFLPA once again
declaimed its interest47 and the players brought suit.48 As the next section
explains, this action was not successful, and the players lost their bargaining
power, resulting in a CBA arguably in favor of the owners.49
In the end, this labor dispute illustrates three important points. First, it
37. Id. at *2−3. See Bell, supra note 14.
38. History, supra note 19.
39. Id.
40. Id. (referring to Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992)).
41. History, supra note 19.
42. Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2011).
43. Id. at 666−67.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 668. This bargaining unit included the “professional football players under contract,
free agents, and prospective players who have been drafted or entered into negotiations with an NFL
team.” Id. This was a more significant term since the disclaiming interest of the union actually occurred a few hours before the lockout was official. As the prior history shows, the owners had never
locked-out the players first. The owners always responded to the player strike by formally announcing a lockout. However, this really provided no change to the dynamic. This was the first time that
the owners would initiate the conduct, and this strategy would prove to be successful.
46. Id.
47. This strategy had worked before. See History, supra note 19.
48. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663.
49. See generally CBA, supra note 7.
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shows that the players and teams have continued to exchange bargaining control over the years. Second, history proves that the mechanisms used have become more legally complicated over time. In the beginning, the teams used
scare tactics, including threats, that they would cancel the season. More recently, the teams have used a very complicated lockout regime that is propped
up by labor law.50 Lastly, it shows that the teams have regained very powerful
bargaining control with Brady.
B.

The “Brown Period” and Brady v. NFL

In addition to examining the history of labor disputes, one must understand the period within the labor negotiation scheme that this article deals
with. The “Brown Period,” as this article concerns, is the negotiation
timeframe after the CBA has expired and before legal impasse occurs where
antitrust
litigation
becomes available. This can best be understood by reviewing two cases.51 In
Brown, professional football players sought relief through an antitrust action
against the NFL for unilaterally implementing player contract provisions that
were not legally agreed upon between the NFL and the players.52 More
specifically, the action concerned a wage dispute.53 When negotiations over
the wage issue came to an impasse, the owners agreed, without the players union involvement, to implement the wage contract provisions that were a result
of the last reasonable negotiation effort.54 The players argued that these unilateral changes violated antitrust laws under the Sherman Act.55 Relying on
prior sports precedent,56 the Supreme Court determined that the unilateral
changes did not violate the Sherman Act.57 Moreover, the Supreme Court embraced a broader notion that action taken place as a result of the implementation of the CBA would be exempt from federal antitrust law and thus be governed
by
federal labor laws, even if the agreement expired.58 This decision has been
understood as implementing a period of time called the “Brown Period,” during which federal labor laws, rather than federal antitrust provisions, govern
50. One reason for this complexity and sophistication is the fact that the NFLPA has become
stronger over the past decade.
51. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Brady, 644 F.3d at 661.
52. Brown, 518 U.S. at 233−34.
53. Id. at 235.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generally Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
57. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
58. See id.
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the NFL’s action.
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court decided another case that solidified
the boundaries of the “Brown Period.”59 In Brady, the NFL players brought
suit, claiming that the 2011 lockout, discussed above, violated federal antitrust
laws.60 More specifically, the players sought a preliminary injunction, claiming that “the lockout [was] an unlawful group boycott that was causing irreparable harm to the Players.”61 When the district court granted the injunction,
the NFL teams appealed to the Eighth Circuit.62
In holding that the injunction violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Eighth Circuit provided an expanded view of Brown. After restating the factors
significant in Brown,63 the court analyzed the specific case facts with these
factors in the backdrop. Most importantly, the court held that the “Brown
Period” extended to the specific facts of this case.64 Although the district court
had reasoned that both parties had foregone traditional labor law negotiations,
the Eighth Circuit held that the labor law protections extended well beyond
this abandonment.65
In the end, Brown and Brady established the playing field for this article.
This playing field is the “Brown Period”—after the CBA expiration but before
traditional impasse. During this timeframe, NFL teams are allowed to lockout
its players and prevent them from working. Furthermore, the Brady case
provided that this timeframe can be extended well beyond the time those
traditional negotiations ceased. Left with no other option, NFL players would
have two choices during this “Brown Period”: either sit out from playing and
not get paid, or agree to a less than optimal CBA. With only these two options, it is easy to see why the 2011 CBA resulted in arguably unfavorable
terms for the players.66 But, if state-contract-law claims become viable, a third
option would be provided to these players during the “Brown Period.”

59. See Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 665−66 (“The Supreme Court held that the non[-]statutory labor exemption applied to
the employer conduct at issue, which (1) took place during and immediately after a collectivebargaining negotiation, (2) grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process, (3) involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively, and (4)
concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining relationship.”).
64. See id. at 682.
65. Id. at 668, 682.
66. See generally CBA, supra note 7.
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C.

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

Now that the labor dispute history and “Brown Period” have been
explained, the last area of background is the relevant statutory language. Part I
explained that labor law scholars would quickly trash this article thinking that
federal labor law preempts state-contract-law claims. The basis for this
argument comes from section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, as
codified at 29 U.S.C. §185(a), which states as follows:
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship. Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this [Act], or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.67
Although this language does not provide guidance or analysis on the
preemptive effect,68 the language itself can help recognize what exactly the
United States Supreme Court is interpreting in the next section.69
III. PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF SECTION 301
A.

Section 301 Supreme Court Precedent

Preemption occurs when a federal statute displaces a state statute.70
Because the federal and state government run concurrently in numerous areas,
the doctrine of preemption has become a vitally important principle.71
Originally, preemption was viewed as an arm of the Supremacy Clause.72
67. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2016).
68. The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of this language will be thoroughly examined in the next section.
69. Furthermore, the language of the statute will become important in Part III.C. In that subsection, I will generally discuss section 301 preemption as it specifically pertains to state-contract law.
For this discussion, I will dispose of the idea of express preemption. This is clear because the language shows that there is no express preemption clause. Even the language itself, suits “may be
brought” is not an affirmative requirement.
70. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2000) (and sources cited therein).
71. See id. at 225.
72. Id. at 234.
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However, this view has been displaced. Leading scholars, such as Caleb
Nelson, have reversed this view, and preemption is now firmly placed within
the framework of statutory interpretation.73 To understand the preemptive
scope of section 301, the applicable Supreme Court case law must be analyzed.74
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the
Supreme Court received its first opportunity to analyze section 301.75 There,
the union and employer entered into a CBA that was to run from
year-to-year unless terminated with specific notice.76 The agreement also
provided that “there would be no strikes or work stoppages and that grievances
would be handled pursuant to a specified procedure.”77 Soon after, many
grievances arose out of concern for workloads and work assignments.78 After
the employer refused to utilize the specified procedures required in the CBA to
solve these grievances, the union brought suit.79 After reviewing section 301,
the Court held that section 301 is more than merely a jurisdictional statute.80
Instead, the statute “authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements.”81 Therefore,
the federal district court could not only adjudicate the suit, but could also
provide proper remedial measures.82
73. Id. at 265.
74. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, the Court discussed the possible preemption of the NLRA in connection with the Board authority. While this could have some bearing on this
case, Garmon preemption does not apply because nothing in this article’s state-contract-law claim
would question the NLRB or possible unfair labor practices. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359
U.S. at 239. This was the significance in Joe Caldwell’s case in which he claimed that the ABA’s
unfair labor practices were a tort violation. See Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 66 F.3d 523,
525 (2d Cir. 1995). However, Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass’n, Inc. resulted directly from a
valid CBA which gave the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 527. Furthermore, the state-tort claim
imposed duties on the parties that are outside the scope of duties voluntarily invoked on the teams.
See id. This practical difference will be further explained in Part III.C. In that section, I will explain
how state-contract law just provides a forum to adjudicate the claims that the parties voluntarily
agreed
upon.
This
‘voluntariness’ element is a significant distinguishing factor with possible everlasting effects. As the
section will provide, no one will argue that the owners are: 1) required to lockout the players or 2)
required to agree to these contractual obligations outside of the CBA. By doing these actions, the
owners could arguably be waiving their protections.
75. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449−51 (1957).
76. Id. at 449.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 450–51.
81. Id. at 451.
82. Id. at 451−52.
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Less than five years later, the Supreme Court faced another opportunity to
determine section 301’s meaning.83 In Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co., an employee was
discharged after causing damage to the employer’s equipment.84 After being
discharged, the union questioned this action and received notice that the
employee had been discharged due to unsatisfactory work.85 Due to this
response, the union called a strike to get the employee rehired.86 After the
eight-day strike, the issue was submitted to an arbitration board, which
ultimately agreed with the employer.87 In addition, the employer brought suit
in Washington state court requesting damages for lost business.88 After
determining that the state court was not preempted jurisdictionally or
substantively, the Court held that the “strike was a violation of the collective
bargaining contract” and awarded damages.89 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reviewed “whether § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
deprives state courts of jurisdiction over the litigation.”90 Easily disposing of
this question, the Court held that section 301 does not preclude state courts
from taking jurisdiction over cases that involve the possible interpretation of
CBAs.91
However, the Court did not stop at the jurisdictional question, and moved
to a discussion of the substantive question. Relying on Lincoln Mills, the
Court held that the state court, although obtaining jurisdiction over the action,
must substantively apply federal common law when ruling on conduct within
the
statute.92 A contrary rule, according to the Court, would completely undermine the entire scheme and provide for possible different interpretations of the
CBA in different jurisdictions.93 The Court further expanded this view seven
83. See generally Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
84. Id. at 97.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 97−98.
90. Id. at 101.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 103.
93. See id. (“The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal
labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the
process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues
raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.”).
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years later.94 In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, the Court held that these actions, which fall
into
the
purview of the federal substantive law, are ripe for removal to federal court
with compliance of the removal statute.95
While the precedent clearly shows that federal common law is warranted
when the action falls within section 301, it does not provide clear guidance on
how to determine whether state-law claims are preempted entirely. In 1985,
the Court began to clarify this point.96 In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the
Court had to determine whether “the state[-]tort claim is preempted by the national labor laws” when concerning disability plans.97 The facts showed that
the
employee had lost his disability benefits due to the employer’s numerous late
payments.98 Although the CBA provided a grievance mechanism for this type
of conduct, the employee never attempted this mechanism and instead brought
suit in state court.99 On appeal, the Court held that section 301 preempted the
state-law claim because the clause directly related to the CBA.100 However,
the Supreme Court held that state-law rights and obligations that exist
independently within a private contract are not preempted.101 Furthermore, the
94. See generally Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
95. Id. at 560.
96. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 203 (1985).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 205.
99. Id. at 206.
100. Id. at 210−11.
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract
disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a
contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions
relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences
were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to
uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of
contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over
substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract
claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.
Id. at 211.

101. Id. at 213.
Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private
agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties,
are pre-empted by those agreements. Cf. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. [497,]
504−505 (NLRA pre-emption). Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin
tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers non[-]negotiable
state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by
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Court noted the limited scope of section 301 preemption:
Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, or
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the
federal labor law. Section 301 on its face says nothing about
the substance of what private parties may agree to in a labor
contract. Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in
adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of
private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any
inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law would delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt
themselves from whatever state labor standards they
disfavored.102
While Allis-Chalmers Corp. disposed of the case at hand, the Court failed
to provide a clear standard to apply in future preemption cases. However, the
Court provided this standard three years later.103 In Lingle v. Norge Division
of Magic Chef, Inc., the employee brought charges under state-tort law against
her employer for retaliatory discharge.104 Because the CBA provided “her
with a contractual remedy for discharge without just cause,”105 the federal district court dismissed the complaint, holding that it was preempted by the
CBA’s
provision.106 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.107
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. While the district court had held that
the state-law claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA, the Court
disagreed, holding that none of the elements of the retaliatory discharge
claimed required interpretation of the CBA.108 Under the Illinois retaliatory
discharge claim, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s burden required that she
prove: “‘(1) [that] [s]he was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2)
contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract. If the state[-]tort law purports to define
the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted.
Id.

102. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211−12.
103. See generally Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
104. Id. at 401.
105. Id.
106. Id. Her suit was in federal court because it had been promptly removed by the employer
from Illinois state court.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 407.
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the employer’s motive in discharging or threatening to discharge [her] was to
deter [her] from exercising [her] rights.’”109 According to the Court, “[n]either
of
th[os]e
elements requires a court to interpret any term of a [CBA].”110 Furthermore,
the Court fleshed out the argument relating to the use of the CBA as an element of the state claim, stating that “[a]lthough the state-law analysis might
involve
attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination
whether petitioner was fired for just cause, such parallelism does not render the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.”111
Since Lingle, courts have held this independent versus dependent rationale
as a significant distinction in determining section 301 preemption.112 For
example, in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, the employee brought a
retaliatory discharge suit after bringing a grievance concerning his
employment.113 After the employee requested that a piece of equipment be
replaced to prevent future injury and his supervisor denied this request, the
employee was suspended pending a termination hearing.114 In determining
that the state-law claim was not preempted, the Court held:
The CBA is not the “only source” of respondent's right not to
be discharged wrongfully. In fact, the “only source” of the
right respondent asserts in this action is state[-]tort law. Wholly apart from any provision of the CBA, petitioners had a
state-law
obligation not to fire respondent in violation of public policy
or in retaliation for whistle-blowing. The parties' obligation
under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the CBA did not relieve petitioners of

109. Id. (quoting Horton v. Miller Chem. Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985)) (discussing
the retaliatory discharge cause of action). For an Illinois Supreme Court case explaining the retaliatory discharge cause of action elements, see generally Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng’g Corp., 503 N.E.2d
308 (Ill. 1986).
110. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407.
111. Id. at 400.
112. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 257 (1994). See also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994) (holding that a state-law claim is not preempted because the obligations and rights existed independent of the CBA); Thompson v. Hibbing Taconite Holding Co., No.
08-868 (JRT/RLE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87045, at *11 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2008) (“[V]iolat[ions]
[of] such non-negotiable state law rights [which did] not require an interpretation of the CBA, and
would not be preempted under the LMRA.”).
113. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 249−50.
114. Id.
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this duty.115
The Supreme Court’s decisions discussed above can be summarized as
embracing three overarching principles. First, section 301’s preemption
purpose is to ensure that CBA provisions are interpreted under the same
principles from state to state.116 Second, section 301’s preemptive scope is
limited117 to only those state-law principles that require an explicit interpretation of, or understood as being “inextricably intertwined” with, the CBA.118
Finally, this preemption does not extend to any state-law claim that provides
rights and obligations outside the CBA.119
Applying these principles to NFL players’ state-law-contract claims after
the expiration of the CBA, it can easily be argued that section 301, in light of
precedent, is not preemptive. This preemption failure can be explained by
analyzing the prior precedent as it applies to the NFL. First, this situation
presents a scenario that is distinguishable from the prior preemption case law.
In each of the prior cases, a valid CBA existed with specified provisions
concerning the conduct at hand. In Brady, the CBA was no longer valid as it
had expired. In addition, the CBA provided no specified language concerning
the individualized contracts.120 Second, section 301’s preemption could not
possibly be interpreted to extend to the situation discussed here. The
state-contract-law claim would neither require an explicit interpretation of the
CBA nor would it be “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA. Each of these
individualized contracts provides a stand-alone obligation that was individually negotiated between each player121 and each team. For example, in 2009, the
New York Giants and Eli Manning entered into a six-year contract extension.122 Both parties agreed to these terms knowing the agreement would extend well beyond the 2011 CBA expiration.123 This agreement does not require the CBA for interpretation, nor is it “inextricably intertwined.”124 At no
115. Id. at 258.
116. This does not mean that state courts are stripped of the ability to adjudicate these claims.
Instead, it provides the substantive law used in this adjudication.
117. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
118. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408 (1988).
119. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 257.
120. Only two provisions could arguably even be used: the Preamble and Appendix A. However,
both of these provisions are very bare and do not provide any substantive rules regarding this issue.
121. This is one reason why player agents have become so important over recent years.
122. Vacchiano, supra note 8.
123. See id.
124. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408 (1988). Furthermore, any
interpretation of the CBA would be totally tangential and irrelevant to the actual claim as the Lingle v.
Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. Court explained: “[T]he state-law analysis might well involve
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point
would
either Manning or the New York Giants argue that the CBA expiration
invalidated the 2009 contract. Furthermore, neither party argued that the parties should execute a new agreement with the new 2011 CBA. Third, it is
clear that the player contracts provide rights and obligations clearly outside the
CBA. As the Eli Manning example proves, the contract provides stand-alone
rights and obligations that extend well past the expiration of one CBA into the
validation of another. If the contractual provisions were dependent upon the
CBA, the parties would not validly be allowed to enter into contracts beyond
the CBA’s expiration. Furthermore, the contracting parties, such as Manning
and the New York Giants, would be required to execute a new agreement upon
the new CBA’s signing.
In the end, the Supreme Court precedent cannot be interpreted to preempt
the state-contract-law claims. While section 301’s preemptive effect in some
situations has been accepted, the Court has narrowed such situations to where
the CBA either must be interpreted or that the issue involved is “inextricably
intertwined” with the CBA. With neither of these scenarios applying, the
state-law-contract claim must be allowed to proceed against section 301’s
backdrop.
B.
i.

Significant Sports-Specific Case Law

Contract Claim Viability: Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey

In addition to the Supreme Court case law concerning section 301, two
sports specific cases complement the non-preemption argument. The first case
provides that even the NFL teams understand that these professional player
contracts remain enforceable throughout labor strife, whether it is a lockout or
strike, and continue to be valid after a new CBA is signed.125
In Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, an NFL team sought preliminary
and permanent injunctions against one of its players who sought to play for a
team in the newly organized World Football League (WFL).126 The WFL was
an American football league that sprung up for the 1974 season. While the
WFL held a college draft in 1974, it also pursued established NFL players for
future contractual years.127 Signing such players, in the eyes of the WFL,
attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether Lingle was
fired for just cause. But we disagree with the court's conclusion that such parallelism renders the
state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.” Id.
125. See generally Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
126. Id. at 131.
127. Id. at 132−33.
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would garner “credibility” for the league.128 Although Bergey was contracted
with
the
Cincinnati Bengals through the 1974 season, he signed a personal service
contract with a WFL team, the Virginia Ambassadors.129 This contract provided that Bergey “shall commence playing professional football for the Virginia
Ambassadors in May[] 1976.”130 Disapproving of this contract, the Bengals
brought suit.131
While the Bengals were denied the preliminary injunction, the court’s
decision relates to preemption issues in two ways. First, the Bengals were
unconcerned about the future labor strife that was surely on the horizon in early 1974. Furthermore, neither party argued during the litigation that the possibility of a future strike could invalidate the Bengals’ contract with Bergey.132
Second, the Bengals were also concerned with enforcing a contract that surely
would extend into a new CBA. Because the CBA would expire in July 1974,
the
Bengals were seeking to enforce a contract, Bergey’s 1974–75 player contract,
which would be enforceable only during the new CBA. This proves that neither the Bengals nor anyone else argued that the new CBA would require the
parties to execute a new contract.
In the end, Bergey strongly suggests that the player contracts remain valid
during labor strife.133 These labor “protests” do not affect the contract’s validity and provide enforceable provisions during the “Brown Period.”134
ii. Williams v. NFL
The second principle concerns the interplay between section 301 and the

128. Id. at 133.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 131.
132. It is possible that the Bengals feared Bergey would jump to the WFL during the strike, however, this fear has nothing to do with the validity of the contract.
133. It also proves the arguments that were made in the prior section. See Part III.A (discussing
Eli Manning and the Giants).
134. In order for the NFL to argue otherwise, they would have to provide a flip-flop argument. In
Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, the Bengals clearly understood that Bergey’s contract would be
enforceable regardless of the potential 1974 strike. See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 148. Furthermore,
and somewhat oddly, the Bengals argued that the contract was enforceable against the potential negotiation of future contracts—even ones beyond the expiration of the current player’s contract. Id. at
143.
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NFL.135 In Williams v. NFL, Kevin and Pat Williams, after both testing positive for banned substances and receiving suspensions, brought suit against the
NFL, citing Minnesota statutory and common law claims related to drug testing.136 In the district court, section 301 was deemed not preemptive over the
claims
supported through Minnesota’s Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace
Act (DATWA); yet, the state-tort-law claims were preempted.137 Each party
appealed.138
Beginning with the Minnesota statutory claims, the district court held that
these claims were not “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA.139 On appeal,
the NFL argued that Minnesota’s DATWA140 was preempted for three reasons. First, “the claim[s] turn[ed] on [the] analysis of the Policy in order to
determine whether it ‘meets or exceeds’ DATWA’s requirements.”141 Second,
“the claim requires interpretation of the Policy in order to determine whether
the
NFL
qualifie[d] as an employer under DATWA such that the statute’s protections
extend to the Players.”142 Finally, the NFL argued that preemption is necessary because the “uniform interpretation of the CBA/Policy is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the NFL’s business as a national organization.”143
Reviewing these arguments, the Eighth Circuit began with section 301’s Supreme Court precedent.144 The court noted that this precedent proves that section 301’s preemptive power is limited.145 With that limited scope on the horizon, the court turned to the claims themselves.146 In order to determine the

135. See Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009). See generally Dana A. Gittleman, Home
Field Advantage: Determining the Appropriate “Turf” for Williams v. National Football League and
Clarifying Preemption Precedent, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 203 (2012).
136. Williams, 582 F.3d at 872.
137. Id. at 873.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 872–73.
140. Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 181.950−957
(2016).
141. Williams, 582 F.3d at 873.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 874. “However, the Court has established that section 301 does not preempt state-law
claims merely because the parties involved are subject to a CBA and the events underlying the claim
occurred on the job.” Id. (citation omitted). “Of course, not every dispute concerning employment,
or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . .
.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
146. Id.
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preemption, the court cited a two-prong test provided in an earlier case:
First, a “state-law claim is preempted if it is ‘based on’ a . . .
provision of the CBA,” meaning that “the CBA provision at
issue” actually sets forth the right upon which the claim is
based. Second, section 301 preemption applies where a
state-law claim “is ‘dependent upon an analysis’ of the relevant CBA,” meaning that the plaintiff's state-law claim requires
interpretation of a provision of the CBA.147
For the first prong, the court held that the claim at issue is “predicated on
Minnesota law.”148 While the action concerned a clause found in the CBA,
Minnesota state law determined the action itself. Furthermore, the state law
provided that the CBA could contract around these provisions as long as the
minimum, or floor, was maintained.149 For the second prong, the court held
that “[t]he Supreme Court has distinguished those [claims] which require
interpretation or construction of the CBA from those which only require
reference to it.”150 Furthermore, the court noted “‘the crucial inquiry is whether “resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a CBA.”’”151
With this framework, the court held that the NFL could not point to a single
provision within the CBA that must be interpreted.152
After upholding the district court’s decision that the Minnesota statutory
claims were not preempted, the court turned to the state-common-law-tort
claims.153 Once again, the court reasoned that the same test must be applied.154
This time, however, the outcome resulted in preemption based on the fact that
the duties required under these tort claims “cannot be determined without
examining the parties’ legal relationship and expectations as established by the
CBA.”155 Thus, the court reasoned that these claims were “inextricably

147. Id. (quoting Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)).
148. Id. at 878.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 877 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405−06 (1988)).
152. Id. The court noted that the NFL could argue that the Preamble covered this conduct, but
such argument would be a reach. See id.
153. Id. at 880−81.
154. Id. at 881.
155. Id.
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intertwined with consideration of the terms of the [CBA].”156
The Williams case perfectly shows the opposite ends of the spectrum and
allows the state-law claims after the expiration of the CBA, which are at issue
in this article, to be analyzed. With that being said, the state-law-contract
claims at issue in this article resemble Minnesota’s DATWA claims more than
the
Minnesota state-tort law. First, these contracts are agreed upon individually.
With such individual, stand-alone contracts, the claim at issue would be
dependent upon the contract itself rather than the CBA. Furthermore, no
provision of the CBA would have to be interpreted to succeed on these
state-law claims. As with the Minnesota’s DATWA claims, in a lawsuit based
on multi-year player contracts, the NFL cannot point to one provision of the
CBA, outside of the Preamble and other sprinkled unclear provisions, that
would influence the contract claim that the Williams court disavowed. With
no provision, the state-contract-law claims would pass the single most crucial
inquiry, “‘whether “resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning
of a CBA.”’”157 In this case, the state-contract-law claim would not be
dependent upon anything but the contract terms themselves.158
C.
i.

General Preemption Discussion159

Express Preemption

Although section 301-specific case law provides sufficient arguments that
state-contract claims are not preempted, a more generalized discussion of
156. Id. The same analysis was very similar for the other tort claims. Id.
157. Id. at 877 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405−06 (1988)).
158. In addition to these claims, it can also be reasoned that the state-contract-law claim is actually more independent from the CBA than the drug testing at issue in Williams v. NFL. No one would
argue that the NFL could drug test any of its players once the CBA has expired. Furthermore, the
ability to test players would not be restored until the new CBA was agreed upon and executed. However, this is not the case with the contract. As mentioned in prior sections, the contract remains a valid stand-alone agreement after the CBA’s expiration. Once the new CBA is executed, no player is
forced to sign a new contract. Therefore, the player contracts would be more independent than any
drug testing policy at issue. In addition, as Part III.C will explain, the state-contract-law provides no
duties or obligations. It is only a passive statute that can only come into play when parties have voluntarily agreed to the provisions of a contract. At no point would the state-contract-law provide a
cause of action without a valid contract. This is very different from the Minnesota law at issue in Williams. The Minnesota law provided a floor that could not be contracted around. This law would provide
a
cause
of
action
regardless of any other provision.
159. This general discussion will follow the rubric of preemption as Caleb Nelson expounds upon
in his textbook. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 813–90 (2011).

GANN 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/19/17 9:59 AM

2017]C O N T R A C T R IG H T S D U R I N G E M P L O Y E R L O C K O U T S 417
preemption is warranted. This discussion will close any loopholes from the
prior cases.160 Furthermore, this general discussion will provide analysis for
each preemption group. This is also important because case law provides that
the failure of one preemptive group does not foreclose the success of another.161
The best place to begin this discussion is with express preemption. While
express preemption is hard to overcome, it is the easiest to recognize.162 As
Part II.C recognizes, section 301 provides no express preemption clause.
Without this clause, section 301 cannot expressly preempt the state-contractlaw claim.
ii. Implied Preemption
After determining that no express preemption clause is included, implied
preemption must be analyzed. Implied preemption can be broken into two
groups: field and conflict.163 Conflict preemption can further be broken into
four more groups: impossibility, obvious contradictions, wholly precluded
activity, and obstacle preemption.164
Beginning with field preemption, a federal statute is deemed field
preemptive if it “occupies the field.”165 While this type of preemption is
significant,166 courts are reluctant to find field preemption.167 As for section
301, the Supreme Court has already determined that it does not occupy the
field. In Allis-Chalmers Corp., the Court clearly stated “[o]f course, not every
dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a
collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of
the federal labor law.”168 This language alone proves that section 301 is not
field preemptive. Furthermore, other cases prove section 301 does not occupy

160. Furthermore, it will provide more analysis of why Garmon preemption would fail. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957).
161. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000). Although the express
preemption clause failed to preempt the state-law claim, the claim was still preempted under the conflict preemption inquiry. Id. at 869.
162. See e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322 (2008).
163. NELSON, supra note 159, at 847.
164. See id. at 852−53.
165. See id. at 847−48.
166. If federal law is deemed to be field preemptive, the state cannot pass any law within the entire “field.” See id. at 851.
167. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 237 (1947) (describing the factors that
must be considered when determining field preemption).
168. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
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the field.169
With field preemption disposed of, we must next turn to conflict
preemption. While conflict preemption contains four subcategories, obstacle
preemption would be the major battleground for these state-contract lawsuits.170 Obstacle preemption analysis begins with breaking up the potential
“obstacle” into two subcategories: purpose and effect.171 As for purpose, it is
clearly true that the state-contract law has no purpose to conflict with the federal labor law. Most of these state-contract laws come from common law that
dates back well before section 301’s passing and any federal-labor laws.
While the purposiveness analysis was determinative in prior case law,172
the Supreme Court determined that effect could undercut the lack of purpose.173 Therefore, we must consider the effect of the state-contract-law
claims. On their face, it seems clear that these state-contract-law claims could
result in the NFL teams paying players for their contracts or disposing of the
lockout strategy; however, this “effect” must be analyzed more thoroughly.
While these claims could bring the end of the lockout, it is not the state law
itself that has the result. The state law is completely passive and unenforceable unless parties voluntarily agree to the contract provisions. Only after this
agreement is executed will the state law gain teeth for the athletes to bring suit.
However, the “teeth” are based on the contract itself rather than state law.
Therefore,
it
is
the
contract
that
provides the obstacle rather than the state-contract law. This analysis proved
to be important for the Supreme Court.174 In American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, the Court recognized the difference between enforcing the “parties’
169. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255−56 (1994); Williams v. NFL, 582
F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 134−35 (1994); Thompson v.
Hibbing Taconite Holding Co., No. 08-868 (JRT/RLE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87045, at *13 (D.
Minn. Oct. 24, 2008).
170. As obstacle preemption will show, state-contract law is passive and does not provide any
rights or obligations outside of the contract. Due to this significant fact, the state law cannot be
deemed, upon its own force, to make an action impossible, provide obvious contradictions, or wholly
preclude an activity. Furthermore, the NFL has voluntarily agreed to these contractual provisions. If
the NFL felt that locking out players was significant, they can certainly include that provision within
the contract. Part VI will discuss this more thoroughly.
171. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“Our primary function is to determine
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”).
172. See Kesler v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Fin. Responsibility Div., State of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 154
(1962) (finding that lack of purpose of the state statue was determinative in finding no preemption);
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39−40 (1941) (finding that lack of purpose of the state statue was
determinative in finding no preemption).
173. See e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651−52 (1971).
174. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228−29 (1995).
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own,
self-imposed undertakings” rather than “state-imposed obligations.”175
Furthermore, the Court held that preemption did not prevent the states from
“hold[ing] parties to their [own] agreements.”176 In 2014, the Supreme Court
once again recognized the importance of this distinction.177
With Wolens in mind, these state-contract laws do not impose any
obligations upon the NFL or the players. These obligations are the parties’
“own, self-imposed undertakings.”178 Furthermore, this line of analysis can be
further explained. While on its face, the state-contract-law claims appear to
prevent the NFL from locking out its contracted players, the NFL’s inability to
initiate a lockout is better understood as a result of its own initiative. For
example, the NFL would never argue that it “must” lockout players upon the
CBA’s expiration. Furthermore, the NFL would argue that it could contract
away its lockout rights if it felt necessary.179 Therefore, in practical terms, the
NFL has chosen to contract away its right to lock out the players on the front
end—before the CBA expires. By signing players to an extended contract past
the CBA’s impending expiration, these teams have decided that these players,
like Eli Manning, are more important than the possible lockout in the future.180
In the end, Part III shows that it is arguable that section 301 does not
preempt state-contract-law claims through three lines of analysis. First, the
section 301-specific precedent has been evaluated to prove that section 301’s
preemption is narrow. Second, the sports-specific precedent has been evaluated to show that these player contracts remain valid through labor strife. The
Williams case also provides two sports-specific data points to compare these
state-contract claims. Finally, this subsection argues that the general discussion of preemption results in state-contract-law claims not being preempted.
IV. ULTIMATE SPORTING EXCEPTION ANALOG

175. Id. at 228.
176. Id. at 229.
177. Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431 (2014) (“With these preliminary issues behind
us, we turn to the central issue in this case, i.e., whether respondent’s implied covenant claim is based
on a state-imposed obligation or simply one that the parties voluntarily undertook. Petitioners urge us
to hold that implied covenant claims are always pre-empted, and respondent suggests that such claims
are generally not pre-empted, but the reasoning of [American Airlines, Inc. v.] Wolens neither dooms
nor spares all such claims.”).
178. Am. Airlines, Inc., 513 U.S. at 228.
179. NFL teams could negotiate this provision as a trade-off for something else the teams deem
more valuable. An example contract provision is: “at no point in the future upon expiration of this
agreement, the NFL will not lockout its players.”
180. If this is not the case, Part VI will discuss possible ways to combat this effect.
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If taken seriously, the last section provided, at the very least, arguable
grounds that state-contract-law claims could remain viable with labor law
preemption. However, in order to prove to labor law scholars that this labor
law preemption exception will not ruin the federal labor law regime, this section will provide that these state-law-contract claims are ultimately nestled under a tight “sporting exception” rubric.181
The “sporting exception” verbose was first introduced in Europe.182 This
so-called exception rose out of the “specificity of sport[s].”183 With sports’
markets being unique, the exception provides sports “with its own complex
structure of regulation and dispute resolution” that “merits a reserved domain
of authority beyond EU supervision and regulation.”184 As described, the
sporting exception was originally thought to be a blanket exception. However,
the
exception no longer provides blanket immunity from European law;
rather a case-by-case analysis to determine the applicability of general law.185
As Stephen Weatherill famously described,
In my view the correct way to understand the so-called
“sporting exception” in EC law is simply to regard it as the
space allowed to sports governing bodies to show that their
rules, which in principle fall within the EC Treaty where they
have economic effects, represent an essential means to protect
and promote the special character of sport. There is no blanket immunity. There is case-by-case scrutiny. EC law applies, but does not (necessarily) condemn.186
While Europe has thrived on this exception, the American sports’ model
has not followed the same open concept. However, America does have a few
181. As mentioned in the subsection title, this is not truly equivalent to the sporting exception. As
explained below, the sporting exception connotes a situation where sports, as an industry, provide a
unique circumstance to where normal legal principles do not apply. In this case, sports itself does not
provide this unique circumstance; rather it is the extended contracts that the players enter that provides this circumstance. However, as argued below, professional sports, specifically the NFL, provide unique situations that allow these circumstances to flourish.
182. A whole book is dedicated to the discussion of the sporting exception. See generally
RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW
(2008).
183. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER & STEPHEN F. ROSS, HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW
89 (2011).
184. Id.
185. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995
E.C.R. I-04921.
186. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 182, at vii.
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isolated situations that easily could fit into this rubric as an analog. The most
historic would be the antitrust exemption afforded to Major League Baseball.187 In Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Base Ball Clubs, plaintiffs brought an antitrust action arguing
that the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs had violated antitrust
provisions through the monopolization of the sport.188 Resolving the dispute
in favor of the defendants, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, held that
Major League Baseball was exempt from antitrust violations.189 He reasoned
that Major League Baseball was a truly “state affair” and did not qualify as a
regulated business for antitrust purposes.190 In 1952, this decision was affirmed under stare decisis. While baseball’s market had changed to where it
was
easily
characterized as national rather than purely state, the Court continued to hold
the exception valid.191 In 1998, this exception became a congressional statute.192 Although this exception was never expanded to other American
sports,193
it
provides an easy example of how the “sporting exception” analog exists in
American sports law.
With this background, these state-contract lawsuits to enforce contracts
that extend beyond the CBA’s expiration are surely a sporting exception analog as no other industry would have the same capacity to bring suit.194 This is
187. There is an entire book recently published thoroughly explaining this exemption. See generally STUART BANNER, THE BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
(2013). In this easy to read monograph, Professor Banner provides a detailed and well-delineated
discussion of baseball’s antitrust exception.
188. Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
207 (1922).
189. Id. at 208.
190. Id. (“The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs. It is true
that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they have achieved, competitions
must be arranged between clubs from different cities and States. But the fact that in order to give the
exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for
their doing so is not enough to change the character of the business.”).
191. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
192. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998). This act was named after the famous Curt Flood, who challenged the exception’s validity in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972).
193. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447 (1957) (holding that the exception does not extend to
the NFL).
194. This sporting exception idea could also become significant even if the court would determine
that the federal labor law preempts these claims. As Geier v. American. Honda Motor Co., explains,
the Supreme Court is willing to consider preemption waiver if the conflict does not extend far. See
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 871−72 (2000). This section will prove that this
exception would only extend to professional sports and more exclusively to football in North America.
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a result of two unique features of the professional sporting market: 1) longterm,
individualized contracts that extend well beyond the CBA’s expiration; and 2)
lack of comparable employment in North America.
First, the long-term contracts are certainly unique to professional sports.
As the introduction explains, Eli Manning signed a huge contract extension
with the CBA expiration looming.195 This would certainly never happen in
another industry for two reasons: first, no other industry, besides possibly other
entertainment personnel, would sign individualized contracts; and second, the
employment contracts would unilaterally expire at the CBA’s expiration. For
example, any conventional laborer would never sign an individualized contract
nor negotiate his or her salary.196 These terms would be entirely fixed within
the CBA terms. Furthermore, when the CBA expires, these laborers would not
rightfully have an action because their “contract,” the provisions fixed within
the CBA, would ultimately lapse with the expiration. Therefore, the normal
laborer, unlike professional athletes, would resemble the great majority of
individuals that are considered unionized employment.197
Second, professional sports athletes, specifically NFL athletes, are unable
to find comparable employment. Continuing the example above, the normal
laborer, if locked out by their employer, would ultimately seek new
employment. While it may be hard to find the exact same type of employment, they certainly would try to find comparable employment. This is not the
case for NFL players. Once the owners lock them out, many of these individuals are at a loss. They have relied on such extravagant lifestyles that they are
left to pick up the pieces when the huge paychecks cease to be deposited.
Therefore, these individuals would be more willing to risk these state-contractlaw claims rather than seek comparable employment.198 For example, NFL

195. See Vacchiano, supra note 8.
196. This is known through personal experience. My mother works at a paper mill where the
relationship with her employer is controlled by a CBA.
197. For example, most unionized pipe fitters, welders, and other laborers would certainly not
have an individualized contract and their compensation would be based on a fixed agreement between
the
employer and union. Throughout the rest of this section, these individuals are coined “normal laborers.” This connection is not meant to spark any resentment; however it is meant to show a difference
between normal labor negotiations and professional athletes.
198. For example, my mother, and many other unionized laborers, would not have the means to
front a state-contract-law claim even if it was afforded. Furthermore, this distinction eliminates the
entertainment industry personnel that could possibly have a long-term, individualized contract. These
individuals would likely seek other comparable employment, such as another movie role, rather than
waste time and resources to seek these contract claims.
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players’ only resort in North America would be the Canadian Football League
(CFL).
Unfortunately, the CFL provides at least two significant obstacles. First, the
pay would be greatly decreased. Many NFL players would be unwilling to
risk their NFL contracts, once the lockout is lifted, in order to pursue such a
decreased salary. Second, and most significant, the CFL itself implements a
“non-import player ratio.”199 This ratio limits the number of non-Canadian
players that each team can have on its active roster and starting lineup.200 Due
to this ratio, the CFL teams would be unwilling to take a risk on these NFL
players. For example, in order to sign an NFL player, a CFL club would have
to cut one of its non-Canadian players. Furthermore, it may have to rearrange
the starting lineup in order to comply with the ratio. While this NFL player
could provide a huge reward, the risk would be equally as daunting. As soon
as the lockout is lifted, the NFL player would likely leave to seek his past
employment. This would result in harmed relations with the roster players
with truly no reward.
In the end, these state-contract-law claims are clearly a “sporting exception” analog. As this section provides, this exception would only apply to
professional sports athletes and particularly athletes, such as NFL players, who
could not find comparable employment.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the 2011 CBA resulted in arguably unfavorable terms for players,
this article has provided a legal mechanism to ensure that future CBAs could
be negotiated more favorably.201 At the outset, this article posed a hypothetical scenario where it questioned the ability of the Manning brothers to bring
state-contract-law claims during the 2011 lockout. After reading this article, it
becomes clear that Eli and Peyton would have a strong likelihood of success
bringing a state-contract-law claim.202 If this is correct, players with valid
player contracts would be allowed to bring suit against the NFL teams. By using this mechanism, the NFL teams would be required to return to the bargain199. See e.g., Game Rule Ratio, CANADIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.cfl.ca/game-ruleratio/ (last visited May 15, 2017).
200. Id.
201. This article does not, however, make a conclusion about how this legal mechanism will play
out or unfold. For example, it is not entirely implausible to believe that the NFL teams may choose a
strategy to pay these contracted players in order to maintain a significant edge in the collective
bargaining process.
202. While a debate can occur on whether a single state presents the best likelihood of success,
this debate would provide little to this article. It would only take one successful suit on behalf of any
player for the negotiation process to shift.
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ing table and negotiate a fair CBA. While the jury is still out on the significance of this article’s legal mechanism concerning the NFL labor negotiation
context, one thing will remain certain: this article has presented NFL players
with
a
significant legal strategy that has never been used in the past.
As the famous sports figure, John Wooden, stated, “Failing to prepare is
preparing to fail.”203 With that in mind, this article’s goal is to prepare NFL
players for the probable future CBA expiration. In order to accomplish this
feat, a thorough analysis of federal labor law preemption history and an argument to prove that federal law does not preempt state contract law in the NFL
player contract setting was presented. With federal labor preemption unlikely,
this
article suggests that NFL players could regain market power in the collective
bargaining process. Furthermore, this article provided an analytical framework to prove that these state-law-contract lawsuits are a “sporting exception”
analog. In the end, the success of this article will depend on whether an NFL
player decides to pursue it as a strategy; still, such pursuit does not discount
the
availability of this game-changing strategy for all professional sports in the
future.

203. Robert Buderi, Failing to Prepare Is Preparing to Fail, and Other John Wooden Advice for
the Innovation Community (and Everyone Else), XCONOMY (June 7, 2010),
http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2010/06/07/failing-to-prepare-is-preparing-to-fail-and-other-johnwooden-advice-for-the-innovation-community-and-everyone-else/.

